City’s financial accounts for 2022-3 (12 months to June 30, 2023) were filed on June 27^th 2024. City were one of the last clubs to file their accounts. Essentially the year covers Glen Henderson's tenure as chairman / majority owner and City's first season back in the National League. They were spotted by an eager eyed supporter rather than being publicised on the club’s own website.

City filed slightly more than the minimum requirement of a balance sheet which shows the overall financial position of City at the year end and added a brief profit and loss account which showed some detail of income and expenditure during the year, although a welcome addition, it was shown at high level with little breakdown.

City’s accounts should be read in conjunction with those of the York Stadium Management Company (YSMC).

The budget was set during the final days of the Jason McGill era and most of the money spent during the Henderson year. Being filed in June 2024, the Uggla regime will have signed off the accounts.

Salient points include:

• City’s accounts for the 2022/3 season (“The Henderson year” and the first season back at National League level) show a little more transparency than previous years.
• However, there are still many more questions than answers. That aside, the accounts meet statutory reporting requirements and City added a little more detail by including a profit and loss statement. Although a welcome addition, it was at a very high level.
• Given City appeared to be in financial difficulties in early 2023, the accounts are much more robust than many had predicted.
• City’s turnover (income) was up by £1.4m to £3.8m, half of that increase might be explained by increased home gates (average crowd up nearly 50%, an extra home game and increase in match day admission prices).
• In comparison, in 2024, at the time of writing (late June 2024), season ticket sales stand at about 2,300, if every one had been sold at full adult price, proceeds would be about £600,000, but given concessions, it is more likely to be much closer to £450,000. Double that (and add a bit) and ticket sales are well short out full turnover, so that difference must come from other income streams.
• “Operating Loss” is shown as £125,765 (down from £707k a year earlier), in broad terms, this covers normal day to day activity before tax, it might be considered to be a view of the day to day spend or “current account” bank statement. Those losses meant City still lost about £2,700 every single week.
• However, the big reduction in losses demonstrates much more control over finances than in previous years. If every supporter gave an extra £2 every time they passed through the turnstiles the loss would have been fully covered.
• Moving on, for 2022/3, “Loss Before Tax” is a very similar at £125,556. This figure normally includes items such as “one off” payments, transfer fees or other exceptional items and so in City’s case, was skewed in 2021/2 due to the £6.9m sale of Bootham Crescent and / or write off of the interest payments that were due to JMP resulting in a £6.2m profit. My view is that it is due to the interest write off as the assumed Bootham Crescent valuation would have already been included in previous accounts.
• Beyond the wage bill, there is virtually no cost (spend) breakdown.
• Playing and management staff numbers increased to a monthly average of 44 (from 34) whilst “admin” (aka non footballing employees) were 31 (up from 25). The total wage bill for the 75 members of staff was £1.7m (an average of about £400 per week, although it can be expected that there is a big difference in wages between the top earning football staff and the admin staff. Given the increase in staff numbers, the average wage remained constant despite a number of high profile summer 2022 signings.
• Although FFP doesn’t apply to City, the player wages don’t seem unreasonable.
• However, gone are the days of the 1980s when City’s accounts revealed the top earner, one year it was believed to be Denis Smith who was paid between £35k and £40k in one year.
• Beyond wages, there is little breakdown of costs (e.g. travel costs, rent, any JMP payments, general repairs / improvements (e.g. training ground), compensation payments, transfer fees, agent payments, stewarding, cost of sales, SMC charges and the host of other things a club spends money on).
• In fact, the only breakdown is a split of the £3.8m turnover (income) between “Football” (£2.8m) and “Management” (£1m). Don’t ask me where the split occurs but it might be considered to be more like “football” and “admin / office” split. The accounts state the principal activity of the business “continued to be that of a professional football club”, I know of no activity other than football, so it might be argued that that all the turnover was football related.
• In the scheme of things, paying off 2 managers (John Askey and David Webb) will probably have had only a minimal impact on finances in the year.
• There is no income breakdown. A big chunk can be assumed to be matchday income whilst commercial / sponsorship income will be another big number. There is no indication of how much funding was provided by Glen Henderson or the Supporters Trust.
• Most of the above is taken from the “Profit and Loss” part of the accounts, that is a financial account of what happened last season. The other main section is the “Balance Sheet” which essentially states how much the club is worth if it was liquidated. That figure is £3.41m, down a little from £3.55m a year earlier.
• It has been well documented that 10 years rent was paid upfront and that an “extra” rental payment for the 8,000 uplift is due annually. Common accounting practice would be to accrue the 10 years “standard” rental payment that was previously paid and drip one year’s payment into the accounts every year. Given that, I’d expect the P&L section to include one year’s rent payments and all future years that have been pre-paid to be included in the “Balance Sheet “section.
• Next year’s (2023/4 season) account should make interesting reading. In broad terms, turnover should remain steady (a small increase reflecting slightly increased attendances and FA Cup / TV appearance money) but a larger increase in player wages can be expected.
• Footnote:
  1. Note the use of several fluffy words like “might”, “assume”, “probably”, “considered”, “more likely” and “expected”. These are used to indicate the lack of clarity and detail in the accounts, a feature of accounts of many companies far bigger than York City.
  2. In comparison, Harrogate Town’s accounts for the same period were about one third of the length of City, didn’t include a “profit and loss” sheet. They showed employee numbers of 66 (9 less than City) and net assets less than half of those of City. In my book, that makes City probably still the biggest club in North Yorkshire.
  3. “Financial commitments, guarantees and contingent liabilities: Under the terms of a compromise agreement dated 31 March 2022 between the club and the previous majority shareholder, future payments of up to £650,000 (2021 £nil) may be payable dependent upon football related income. This includes prize money received for appearances in certain competitions, gate receipts over a fixed level, any transfer fees and any club assets sold up to 1 April 2026. No provision has been made for this amount in the accounts to 30 June 2022”. It is believed that no payments were made under this provision during the 2022/3 accounting period.
  4. Don’t shoot the messenger, these are the words a non accountant but a numerate person.

Further information can be gleamed from accounts filed at Companies House for YCFC, Bootham Crescent Holdings and York Stadium Management Company.

20+ Years Of City Accounts

York Press - Accounts review

Elsewhere

From our “level”, the Wrexham accounts, in their Vanarama championship winning season, were the most revealing (and most detailed). They revealed a £10.5m turnover and losses of £6.9m. Their turnover was bigger than all Division 2 clubs and even some in Division 1. Their turnover was boosted by huge commercial / social media income and big home crowds. Those losses were on top a £2.9m loss a year earlier.

Meanwhile, Notts County, promoted alongside Wrexham lost £2.75m in their promotion season and once again they are heavily reliant on the generosity of their owner. The size of that club is shown by the fact that they have 274 employees (City had 49 employees during the last JMP season).

Previously reported promotion season losses of other clubs included Stockport (£4.8m, 2022) and Salford (£3.3m, 2019).

If that is what it takes to get back into the Football League ……

In comparison, the next best 2022/3 non league turnovers were those at Chesterfield (£4.6m) and Southend (£4m) whilst at Barnet, turnover was just £1.1m. City can only dream of £10m turnover, or even those of Chesterfield and Southend, I suspect no more than £3m would be nearer the mark.

Out of that comes all expenses, in City’s case, a hefty wage bill and substantial bill for the use of LNER usage, both in terms of rent and stewarding. Combined, they make a profit an unrealistic ambition.

Down the A59, Harrogate noted a £1.169m loss, even with Football League central funding approaching £2m, Harrogate suffer from their perennial problem of low crowds.

Very few clubs ever make a profit, especially at our level. Near theend of the 2023/4 season, we saw the owners of both Rochdale and Torquay turn off the money tap, they can’t or won’t continue to fund the losses. Torquay’s 2022/3 losses were over £1.1m, nearly £100,000 a month.

Premier League wage inflation has filtered down to all levels of the game. Even with their bloated income, Wrexham’s wage bill was 66% of turnover whilst elsewhere that percentage will be higher, indeed, some clubs have a wage bill higher than income guaranteeing a loss.

About the only way to make a profit is to buy small and sell big, or rely on the owner’s ongoing generosity.